We review the history of the philosophy of fondue since Aristotle so as to arrive at the formulation of the paradox of Swiss fondue. Either the wine and the cheese cease to exist (Buridan), but then the fondue is not really a mixture of wine and cheese. Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist. If they do, then either they continue to exist in different places (the chemists), but then a fondue can never be perfectly homogenous (it is (...) a French fondue). Or the wine and the cheese continue to exist in the same place (the Stoïcs), but then wine and cheese have to be, oddly, penetrable and spatially expansible. Aristote attempted to solve this paradox by arguing that the cheese and wine continue to exist, but only potentially in the fondue. We sketch an alternative answer. The wine and the cheese continue to exist, but only non-spatially in the fondue. Wine and cheese, once mixed, become non-spatial constituents of the fondue, a bit like character traits are non-spatial constituents of persons. The wine and the cheese are in the fondue, but only the fondue is there in the fondue pot. (shrink)

Ideological diversity has been on the research agenda in the social sciences for a couple of years. Yet in philosophy, the topic has not attracted much interest. This article tries to start filling this gap. We discuss a number of possible causes for the underrepresentation of right-wing and conservative philosophers in the academic profession. We also argue why this should be an important concern, not only morally, but also and primarily epistemically. Lastly, we explore whether the situation in philosophy is (...) more problematic than the situation in other fields, and what kind of ideological diversity would be desirable for academic philosophy. (shrink)

Touch seems to enjoy some epistemic advantage over the other senses when it comes to attest to the reality of external objects. The question is not whether only what appears in tactile experiences is real. It is that only whether appears in tactile experiences feels real to the subject. In this chapter we first clarify how exactly the rather vague idea of an epistemic advantage of touch over the other senses should be interpreted. We then defend a “muscular thesis”, to (...) the effect that only the experience of resistance to our motor efforts, as it arises in effortful touch, presents us with the independent existence of some causally empowered object. We finally consider whether this muscular thesis applies to the perception of our own body. (shrink)

L’idée générale défendue ici est qu’une telle intuition doit être nuancée car (i) elle surestime la place de l’expérience du corps dans l’expérience tactile. (ii) elle sous- estime la place de l’expérience du corps dans les autres modalités sensorielles et (iii) elle repose sur une définition floue du sens tactile qui la conduit à identifier toute expérience du corps à une expérience tactile.

Deux choses sont en contact s'il n'y a rien entre elles (ni volume, ni ligne, ni point) et qu'elles ne se chevauchent pas (en un volume, un ligne ou un point). Le contact est la limite de proximité des choses : si deux choses sont en contact, deux autres choses ne peuvent être pas être plus près l'une de l'autre sans se pénétrer.

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of Europe. At (...) the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

The development of synthetic biology calls for accurate understanding of the critical functions that allow construction and operation of a living cell. Besides coding for ubiquitous structures, minimal genomes encode a wealth of functions that dissipate energy in an unanticipated way. Analysis of these functions shows that they are meant to manage information under conditions when discrimination of substrates in a noisy background is preferred over a simple recognition process. We show here that many of these functions, including transporters and (...) the ribosome construction machinery, behave as would behave a material implementation of the informationmanaging agent theorized by Maxwell almost 150 years ago and commonly known as Maxwell’s demon (MxD). A core gene set encoding these functions belongs to the minimal genome required to allow the construction of an autonomous cell. These MxDs allow the cell to perform computations in an energy-efficient way that is vastly better than our contemporary computers. (shrink)

The fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was published in 2013. This manual classifies all known mental disorders and provides operationalized criteria for their diagnosis. The goal of this manual is to facilitate communication, treatment and research with reliable and valid diagnoses. This article will provide a study of what this diagnostic validity actually entails. Firstly, it will include a discussion of the different conceptions of validity that have appeared in the literature so far. To (...) decide between these different conceptions, diagnostic validity will be defined as ”picking out a natural kind’. Secondly, two different accounts of natural and psychiatric kinds are examined, namely, essentialism and pragmatism. Both of these will be rejected in favor of conceiving natural kinds as causal-epistemic kinds. Thirdly, it is argued that the multidimensional complexity of psychiatric disorders does not exclude the possibility of psychiatric kinds being natural kinds. However, pragmatic considerations in classifying disorders have meant that the DSM most likely does not distinguish causal-epistemic kinds very well. I argue that the need to have a single classification both for clinicians and researchers and the priority given to reliability rather than validity has ultimately compromised the diagnostic validity of the DSM. (shrink)

The thesis defended is that ordinary perception does not present us with the existential independence of its objects from itself. The phenomenology of ordinary perception is mute with respect to the subject-object distinction. I call this view "phenomenal neutral monism" : though neutral monists are wrong about the metaphysics of perception (in every perceptual episode, there is a distinction between the perceptual act and its perceptual objet), they are right about its phenomenology. I first argue that this view is not (...) as counter-intuitive as it might initially seem, by stressing (i) that the lack of presentation of the mind-independence of perceptual objects does not entail their being presented as mind-dependent. (ii) That phenomenal neutral monism is true of ordinary perception in the thin sense, but not in the thick sense (that includes expectations, guesses, feelings etc. grounded on thin perception). (iii) That the concept of a perceptual perspective or point of view should not be confused with the concept of the subject or intentional act of perception. Second, I propose three positive arguments in favor of phenomenal neutral monism. (i) It does justice to the recurring idea that only resistance to our will presents us with the world qua independent from us. (ii) It does justice to the recurring idea that the most natural attitude towards the perceptual world is that of being absorbed in it. (iii) It is entailed by the view that intentional acts are phenomenally transparent (a view held by Russell and Moore, and most contemporary representationalists) together with the view that in order to be presented with a relation (here the act-object distinction) one has to be presented with its relata. (shrink)

Dans ce texte, nous tentons de montrer qu’à partir de son traitement de l’altérité d’autrui, la philosophie de Lévinas peut être présentée comme le dépassement intérieur de la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty développée dans la Phénoménologie de la perception. Nous commençons par exposer la conception de l’altérité exposée dans la Phénoménologie en éclairant l’intersubjectivité corporelle au fondement de la socialité. Nous tentons ensuite d’en dégager les possibles fondements d’une éthique merleau-pontienne axée sur l’expression-responsive, éthique qui ferait preuve d’une considération importante envers (...) l’altérité d’autrui. Puis, après avoir exploré les limites de cette conception, nous dégageons les concepts de trace et d’an-archie comme les points d’appui autorisant un dépassement intérieur de cette phénoménologie vers ce que Lévinas appelle l’éthique. Enfin, tout en présentant les grandes lignes de celle-ci grâce aux concepts clé de responsabilité et de substitution, nous tentons de mettre en relief un avantage qu’elle comporte eu égard à un problème rencontré par Merleau-Ponty en 1945. (shrink)

À l’origine de la philosophie comme des sciences, il y a, selon Aristote, « l’étonnement de ce que les choses sont ce qu’elles sont ». Nul doute qu’Aristote aurait trouvé en Suisse maints sujets d’étonnement. Qu’est-ce qu’une vache ? Qu’est-ce qu’une montagne ? Qu’est-ce que le Röstigraben ? Qu’est-ce qu’une fondue ? Qu’est-ce qu’un trou dans l’emmental ? Qu’est-ce que l’argent ? Qu’est-ce qu’une banque ? Qu’est-ce qu’une confédération ? Qu’est-ce qu’une horloge ? Qui est Roger Federer ? Qu’est-ce qu’est (...) Anton Marty ? Qu’est-ce que le plaisir de manger du chocolat ? -/- Chaque chapitre de cet ouvrage a été écrit par un spécialiste de renommée internationale et défend une solution claire à l’une de ces questions. Le tout constitue une introduction à la fois accessible et plaisante à un domaine de recherche philosophique aujourd’hui en effervescence : la métaphysique. (shrink)

Il est courant de diviser le champ d’investigation de l’éthique entre trois sous- domaines : la méta-éthique, l’éthique normative et l’éthique appliquée. L’éthique appliquée est le domaine le plus concret : on y traite par exemple des questions de savoir s’il faut autoriser l’avortement, l’euthanasie, la peine de mort... L’éthique normative traite de ces questions à un niveau plus abstrait : elle se demande ce qui fait qu’une action ou un type d’action est moralement bonne ou mauvaise. La relation entre (...) l’éthique normative et l’éthique appliquée est un peu comme la relation entre la science pure, comme la physique, et l’ingénierie (Timmons : 17). Le domaine le plus abstrait de l’éthique est la méta-ethique : elle ne s’occupe par de la question de savoir ce qui fait qu’une action est bonne ou mauvaise (éthique normative) et encore moins de la question de savoir si le suicide est moralement bon ou mauvais. Elle s’intéresse à trois types de questions. Les premières sont métaphysiques : qu’est-ce qu’une valeur, qu’une norme (sont-ce des propriétés naturelles comme la masse, des propriétés non naturelles ? Des choses qui n’existent pas ?) ? Existe-t-il des valeurs objectives ? Les secondes sont épistémologiques : comment connaissons-nous les valeurs et les normes ? Par la raison ? L’intuition ? Les émotions ? Dans la mesure où la méta-éthique semble être le domaine le plus abstrait de l’éthique, la prudence pédagogique voudrait qu’on l’étudie en dernier : commencer par un cas concret, puis remonter petit à petit vers des questions plus abstraites. Pour des raisons qui vous apparaîtront j’espère au fur et à mesure, j’ai choisi de commencer néanmoins par des questions qui relève de la méta-éthique. Nous aborderons l’éthique normative et l’éthique appliquée dans la deuxième partie du cours. (shrink)

Some colors are compound colors, in the sense that they look complex: orange, violet, green..., by contrast to elemental colors like yellow or blue. In the chapter 3 of his Unterschungen zur Sinnespsychologie, Brentano purports to reconcile the claim that some colors are indeed intrinsically composed of others, with the claim that colors are impenetrable with respect to each other. His solution: phenomenal green is like a chessboard of blue and yellow squares. Only, such squares are so small that we (...) cannot discriminate between their location in perception. Consequently we get the impression of an homogeneous green extent. After having presented Brentano's solution, we argued that it is hardly compatible with Brentano's own conception of descriptive psychology, to the extent that it introduces in-existent objects (small yellow and blue squares), which cannot be perceived. We propose another solution to Brentano's puzzle, more in tune with his own assumptions, or so we argue. According to it, the yellow and the blue are in the green without being spatially in the green. A green extent has yellow and blue components, but these are not spatial components. This solution reconciles impenetrability (since the component colors are not localized) with the reality of compounds color. Besides, it has the advantage of taking the phenomenology of compounds colors, as Brentano's describes it, to the letter. Compound colors are what they seem: complex but not spatially complex. (shrink)

Is the societal-level of analysis sufficient today to understand the values of those in the global workforce? Or are individual-level analyses more appropriate for assessing the influence of values on ethical behaviors across country workforces? Using multi-level analyses for a 48-society sample, we test the utility of both the societal-level and individual-level dimensions of collectivism and individualism values for predicting ethical behaviors of business professionals. Our values-based behavioral analysis indicates that values at the individual-level make a more significant contribution to (...) explaining variance in ethical behaviors than do values at the societal-level. Implicitly, our findings question the soundness of using societal-level values measures. Implications for international business research are discussed. (shrink)

Thèse de la résistance : l’expérience de la résistance est une condition nécessaire de notre idée d’un monde extérieur.

Alors que le débat sur le caractère scientifique ou pseudo-scientifique de l’agriculture biodynamique occupe régulièrement le débat public, l’histoire et la philosophie des sciences ne semblent que très peu s’être emparées de ce sujet. La thèse défendue ici est double : tout d’abord, si l’agriculture biodynamique rencontre un relatif succès aujourd’hui, cela tient sans doute au fait que son théoricien, R. Steiner, a été un des premiers à critiquer le paradigme qui domine l’agronomie, ou en tout cas l’agriculture, depuis plus (...) d’un siècle. Cette critique semble d’ailleurs se maintenir dans ses motifs tout au long du XXe siècle, jusqu’à une certaine critique contemporaine de l’agro-industrie et de ses conséquences désastreuses sur l’environnement. Or, et c’est la seconde thèse défendue ici, cette critique semble méconnaître voire occulter la réalité des débats internes qui ont traversé l’agronomie au cours du XXe siècle et qui continuent de l’agiter aujourd’hui : l’agronomie système a ainsi par exemple intégré dans ses objets des éléments de l’agriculture biodynamique. Selon nous, le problème principal est que l’agronomie est souvent abordée selon une approche externaliste, qui doit impérativement être complétée par une approche internaliste afin tout d’abord de distinguer ce qui relève de la science et ce qui relève du mysticisme, et ensuite de saisir toute la richesse historique et épistémologique de l’agronomie. (shrink)

Nous distinguons ordinairement le corps de l’esprit : nous parvenons aisément à concevoir (même si nous n’y croyons pas forcément) que notre esprit survive à notre corps, ou qu’il aille se loger dans un autre corps. Il y a là, pensons-nous, une véritable différence de nature. Mais bien que cette distinction nous soit très intuitive, dès lors que nous cherchons à spécifier le critère sur lequel elle repose, elle se dérobe. Tout se passe comme si nous n’avions aucun mal à (...) classer les choses d’un côté ou de l’autre de la frontière qui sépare le corps de l’esprit, mais que nous ne parvenions pas à la définir précisément. A quel critère obéissons- nous en effet lorsque nous opérons une bipartition entre phénomènes mentaux et phénomènes physiques dans un ensemble tel que : une croyance, le téléphone du salon, un aimant, l’envie d’un florentin, le Mont Blanc, la vue du Mont Blanc, un claquement de porte, un regret, le bruit d’un moulin, la connaissance du théorème de Thalès, la jalousie, la couleur de la neige, le souvenir d’un citronnier à Menton ? Nous serions probablement tous d’accord pour ranger du côté des phénomènes physiques le téléphone du salon, le claquement de porte, la couleur de la neige, l’aimant, le Mont Blanc et le bruit du moulin ; et du côté des phénomènes mentaux la croyance, l’envie d’un florentin, le regret, la vue du Mont Blanc, la connaissance du théorème de Thalès, la jalousie et le souvenir d’un citronnier de Menton. Mais nous divergerions probablement si nous avions à formuler le critère d’après lequel nous avons opéré cette bipartition. La première chose à faire est donc de tenter d’examiner les critères qui peuvent nous permettre d’établir la distinction entre le corps et l’esprit afin de retenir le plus pertinent. Dans la mesure du possible, celui-ci devra être à la fois informatif (ne pas nous renvoyer simplement à la distinction intuitive que nous pratiquons quotidiennement) et neutre (par exemple être acceptable aussi bien par un dualiste que par un matérialiste). Une fois cette distinction établie, nous serons en mesure de poser trois problèmes. (shrink)

Le sens commun distingue le corps de l’esprit. Il considère par exemple que les désirs et les souvenirs sont des phénomènes mentaux alors que les sons et les courants d’air sont des phénomènes physiques. Au sein de l’esprit, il distingue diverses facultés mentales : il considère par exemple que l’imagination est distincte de la volonté, qui est elle-même distincte de la perception. Au sein de la faculté perceptive, il distingue cinq sens : l’odorat, le goût, la vue, le toucher et (...) l’ouïe. Cette distinction entre différentes modalités perceptives s’avère tout à fait opératoire : nous n’avons le plus souvent aucun mal à répondre à la question « comment avez- vous perçu X : l’avez-vous vu, entendu, touché, ... ? ». En outre, cette distinction semble robuste : elle résiste par exemple à la co-occurrence d’expériences de modalités distinctes. Ainsi pouvons-nous voir et entendre un planeur à la fois. Enfin, nous semblons convaincus, en ce qui concerne les humains, du caractère exhaustif de cette distinction : il nous arrive certes de parler de l’intuition comme d’un sixième sens, ou de parler du sens de l’humour ou des affaires, mais ces expressions sont entendues en un sens figuré. (shrink)

Nous défendons la thèse selon laquelle les images sont phénoménalement transparentes : nous ne voyons (quasiment) jamais leur surface mais seulement ce que les images dépeignent, ce qui implique que notre expérience des images est fondamentalement une illusion. Cette thèse s’oppose à celle de R. Wollheim, qui fait aujourd’hui figure de position standard, selon laquelle nous percevons la surface et le depictum. Une même expérience perceptive, selon nous, ne peut avoir deux objets ou deux aspects. En ce sens, nous sommes (...) plus proche de la position de E.H. Gombrich : nous percevons soit la surface, soit le depictum, mais jamais les deux. Nous cherchons toutefois à la radicaliser en soutenant qu’il est finalement très rare de percevoir la surface de l’image. (shrink)

La question que nous allons aborder dans ce cours est la suivante : peut-on réduire une société une simple agrégation d’individus, ou est-elle plus que cela ? Cette question introduit le débat qui oppose, en sciences sociales, les tenants de l’individualisme à ceux du holisme. En première approximation, les individualistes sociaux pensent qu’une société n’est rien de plus qu’une somme ou une agrégation d’individus. Les holistes sociaux pensent au contraire qu’une société n’est pas réductible à une simple agrégation d’individus. C’est (...) là une question fondamentale aussi bien pour les sociologues que pour les philosophes. Mais en tant que futurs ingénieurs, vous vous dites peut-être que cela ne va pas vous empêcher de dormir. Pour vous convaincre qu’il y a là certaines raisons sinon de faire des nuits blanches, du moins d’avoir quelques discussions animées, nous allons rapprocher cette question, que l’on traitera dans la première partie du cours, de deux autres dont l’enjeu vous semblera certainement plus immédiat. Nous les traiterons respectivement dans les deuxième et troisième parties du cours. (shrink)

Nous avons montré en première partie que la question du corps et de l’esprit posait trois problèmes distincts : le problème de la corrélation (comment expliquer la corrélation du corps et de l’esprit sans renoncer à leur différence de nature ?), le problème du corps propre (notre corps est-il un simple objet pour notre esprit ?), et le problème de la prévention de l’esprit à l’égard des corps (pourquoi considérons-nous plus volontiers que le monde se compose de corps que d’évènements (...) ou de processus ?). Il ne faut donc pas réduire la question du corps et de l’esprit au seul problème de la corrélation. Cela dit, il faut maintenant souligner que le problème de la corrélation est de loin de plus important des trois, qu’il est en substance celui qui, des présocratiques à nos jours, a fait l’objet de l’attention philosophique la plus grande. La deuxième partie de ce cours lui sera donc consacrée. (shrink)

La question à laquelle je veux tenter de répondre est la suivante : Quelle est la nature ontologique de ce que nous percevons lorsque nous sommes sujets à une illusion ou à une hallucination ? (Cette question n’est pas directement liée au thème de ce séminaire, mais la réponse que je veux lui apporter l’est.) La réponse proposée est la suivante : Ce que nous voyons en cas d’illusion est une propriété physique du milieu perceptif attribuée à l’objet perçu.

I defend the view that the experience of resistance gives us a direct phenomenal access to the mind-independence of perceptual objects. In the first part, I address a humean objection against the very possibility of experiencing existential mind-independence. The possibility of an experience of mind-independence being secured, I argue in the second part that the experience of resistance is the only kind of experience by which we directly access existential mind-independence.

On entend par survenance moral la thèse selon laquelle, nécessairement, si deux entités sont parfaitement similaires en ce qui concerne toutes leurs propriétés non-morales, elles sont parfaitement similaires en ce qui concerne leurs propriétés morales. En dépit de son apparente simplicité, cette définition pose de nombreux problèmes. Ainsi, alors que la survenance morale est souvent présentée comme l’une des rares thèses faisant consensus en philosophie, il s’avère à y regarder de près que son interprétation varie grandement selon les philosophes. Trois (...) questions, en particulier, demandent à être éclaircies, sur lesquelles nous nous concentrerons ici : 1. On fait souvent appel à la survenance dans le but d’expliquer les propriétés morales. Mais à strictement parler, la survenance ne revêt par elle-même aucun caractère explicatif : quelle relation la survenance morale entretient-elle avec la relation de fondation ou d’explication morale ? 2. On tient la survenance morale pour une thèse consensuelle, mais on s’accorde peu sur la base de survenance des valeurs morales6. D’aucuns la restreignent à des propriétés naturelles ; d’autres y incluent des propriétés non-naturelles, pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas normatives ; d’autres encore y incluent des propriétés normatives, pour peu qu’elles ne soient pas morales ; d’autres enfin y incluent les principes moraux eux-mêmes. Que recouvre exactement la base de survenance des propriétés morales ? La survenance est une thèse modale (« nécessairement... »). Mais quelle modalité entre-t-elle ici en jeu ? La nécessité qui sous-tend la survenance morale est-elle métaphysique, conceptuelle, normative...? (shrink)

This paper argues (i) that the possibility of experiencing at once pleasures and unpleasures does not threaten the contrariety of pleasure and unpleasure. (ii) That the hedonic balance calculated by adding all pleasures and displeasures of a subject at a time yields an abstract result that does not correspond to any new psychological reality. There are no resultant feelings. (iii) That there are nevertheless, in some cases, sentimental fusions: when the co-occurent pleasures and unpleasures do not have any bodily location, (...) and that their intentional object vanishes, they truly fuse with each other, giving rise to sentimental mixtures in which the initial pleasures and unpleasures are no longer discernible. (shrink)

This presentation discusses a notion encountered across disciplines, and in different facets of human activity: autonomous activity. We engage it in an interdisciplinary way. We start by considering the reactions and behaviors of biological entities to biotechnological intervention. An attempt is made to characterize the degree of freedom of embryos & clones, which show openness to different outcomes when the epigenetic developmental landscape is factored in. We then consider the claim made in programming and artificial intelligence that automata could show (...) self-directed behavior as to the determination of their step-wise decisions on courses of action. This question remains largely open and calls for some important qualifications. We try to make sense of the presence of claims of freedom in agency, first in common sense, then by ascribing developmental plasticity in biology and biotechnology, and in the mapping of programmed systems in the presence of environmental cues and self-referenced circuits as well as environmental coupling. This is the occasion to recall attempts at working out a logical and methodological approach to the openness of concepts that are still to be found, and assess whether they can operate the structuring intelligibility of a yet undeveloped or underdeveloped field of study, where a “bisociation" and a unification of knowledge might be possible. (shrink)

This paper defends the action-theory of the Will, according to which willing G is doing F (F≠G) in order to make G happen. In a nutshell, willing something is doing something else in order to bring about what we want. -/- I argue that only the action-theory can reconcile two essential features of the Will. (i) its EFFECTIVITY: willing is closer to acting than desiring. (ii) its FALLIBILITY: one might want something in vain. The action-theory of the will explains EFFECTIVITY (...) by claiming that each time one wants G, one accomplishes the action of doing F ( it is argued following Von Wright that every action has a result as a proper part, here F). And the action-theory explains FALLIBILITY by claiming that although willing G entails making some F happen –the result of the action of willing–, it does not entail that G –the intended consequence of our willing– will happen. -/- By contrast, behaviorist accounts of the will (which merely equate willing with an action) captures its EFFECTIVITY but loose its FALLIBILITY. And volitionist accounts (which introduce naked volitions lacking any essential results) capture the FALLIBILITY of the will, but loose its EFFECTIVITY. -/- I consider disjunctivist accounts of trying (such as O'Shaughnessy and Hornsby's ones) as an alternative way to reconcile EFFECTIVITY and FALLIBILITY. I argue that though the view manages to reconcile these two constraints, it does so only at the price of gerrymandering the concept of willing (or trying): failed tryings end up having nothing in common with successful ones. -/- I then address three objections to the action-theory of the will, to the effect (i) that not all actions have a result (ii) that total failures are possible (iii) that willing is more fundamental than acting. I argue in answer (i) that all actions have results (results which can be irrelevant to the production of the goal, or which can be merely mental images), (ii) that total failures do not correspond to acts of will, but to mere desires or wishes, and (iii) that given the possibility of basic actions, acting has to be more fundamental than willing (and trying). (shrink)

The thesis defended is that at a certain arbitrary level of granularity, mountains have sharp, bona fide boundaries. In reply to arguments advanced by Varzi (2001), Smith & Mark (2001, 2003) I argue that the lower limit of a mountain is neither vague nor fiat. Relying on early works by Cayley (1859), Maxwell (1870) and Jordan (1872), this lower limit consists in the lines of watercourse which are defined as the lines of slope starting at passes. Such lines are metaphysically (...) sharply delineated although they are not always easy to get at when facing a mountain. Hence, the indetermination is only epistemic. In the second part of the paper, I try to combine this claim about the lower limit of a mountain with more recent claims advanced by alpinists on the right way to measure the height of a mountain, so as to capture its topographic prominence. I argue following them that the proper height of a mountain is the difference of altitude between its summit and its key-saddle, defined as the highest saddle one needs to cross in order to reach the closest higher summit. Combining this two plausible views about the lower limit and height of a mountain leads to the surprising result that the key-saddle needed to measure the height of a mountain is not necessarily located on the lower-boundary of that mountain. (shrink)

Le tome 68 de l’Édition intégrale des œuvres de Martin Heidegger, qui met en scène un important épisode de son explication avec Hegel, a relativement peu été commenté jusqu’à ce jour. Cet article se veut une analyse approfondie de la première moitié du texte, intitulée « La négativité ». Heidegger y traque l’origine de la négativité hégélienne et en vient à proposer lui-même un concept de « néant » qu’il juge plus originaire que celui de son prédécesseur.

L’ambition du présent article est de montrer la filiation entre le naturalisme d’Henry David Thoreau et ses positions antiesclavagistes. Je défends que cette filiation se fait voir par la façon dont l’éthique de Thoreau s’appuie sur une certaine conception de la nature et par la manière dont ses vues abolitionnistes découlent de cette éthique. Je fais valoir, plus précisément, que la fuite de Thoreau dans la nature n’est pas seulement, comme le prétend le politologue Malcom Ferdinand, un moyen comme un (...) autre qu’emploierait Thoreau pour protester contre l’esclavagisme. Il faut plutôt voir en l’idée que se fait Thoreau de la nature ce qui nourrit ses positions antiesclavagistes. L’éthique de Thoreau est une éthique de la vertu qui repose sur l’idée que l’être humain est un être de nature. L’accomplissement humain doit être pensé en rapport avec une certaine idée de nature – la nature sauvage – et l’esclavage condamné parce qu’il dénature l’homme. L’abolitionnisme de Thoreau n’est donc pas, comme le défend Ferdinand, la cause du naturalisme de Thoreau. C’est bien plutôt de son naturalisme que découlent ses vues abolitionnistes. (shrink)

Le texte du Banquet de Platon constitue l’un des témoignages les plus importants de ce que fut l’institution pédérastique en Grèce antique. Le dialogue sur l’amour, qui prend la forme d’une réunion au cours de laquelle les différents protagonistes feront successivement l’éloge d’Éros, pose toutefois problème dans la mesure où la position de l’auteur est éminemment ambigüe. Bien que la position de Diotime semble plus cohérente avec le reste de la doctrine platonicienne, il serait malgré tout réducteur de considérer celle (...) de Pausanias comme un simple détour rhétorique opéré par Platon. Ainsi, il s’agira de montrer dans quelle mesure la position de Pausanias mérite une attention particulière. Il semble en effet que la thèse platonicienne, bien que réticente à encourager les relations homosexuelles charnelles, ne consiste pas en une réfutation complète des conclusions de Pausanias. (shrink)

Afin d’échapper au dilemme de la fondation, Karen Bennett a proposé une thèse selon laquelle la relation de fondation serait superinterne, c’est-à-dire qu’elle reposerait entièrement sur la nature du relatum de gauche. Si cette approche peut de prime abord sembler particulièrement convaincante en raison de sa simplicité et de son élégance, un examen plus minutieux révèle toutefois d’importantes difficultés. Dans cet article, j’élabore de nombreuses critiques contre la thèse de la superinternalité qui s’avère moins intuitive qu’elle ne le laisse paraître. (...) Je considère ensuite l’alternative que représente la sémantique métaphysique développée par Ted Sider. (shrink)

Dans La vie de l’esprit, Hannah Arendt propose une interprétation inédite du tournant (Kehre) survenu au sein de la pensée de Martin Heidegger au milieu des années trente. Arendt comprend en effet le tournant comme un événement biographique à situer entre les deux tomes qui regroupent les cours et essais que Heidegger a consacrés à Nietzsche entre 1936 et 1946. Selon elle, souci et Volonté de puissance viendraient à ne faire qu’un dans le premier tome du Nietzsche, alors que Heidegger (...) opérerait une répudiation de la volonté dans le second. La thèse d’Arendt peut-elle être confirmée par une lecture attentive du Nietzsche ? Sa conception du tournant permet-elle d’aborder le problème selon un angle adéquat ? Nous tenterons de répondre à ces questions à la lumière des fils conducteurs que seront pour nous les concepts de « souci », de « résolution » et de « décision ». (shrink)

To be optimistic, it is standardly assumed, is to have positive expectations. I here argue that this definition is correct but captures only one variety of optimism – here called factual optimism. It leaves out two other important varieties of optimism. The first – focal optimism – corresponds to the idea of seeing the glass half full. The second – axiological optimism – consists in the view that good is stronger than bad. Those three varieties of optimism are irreducible to (...) each other and do not belong to a common kind. I define each of these, characterize their respective correctness conditions, and contrast hope with optimism. (shrink)

1. Hume e a Magna Carta: em torno do círculo da justiça, Maria Isabel Limongi; 2. Hume e o problema da justificação da resistência ao governo, Stephanie Hamdan Zahreddine; 3 O surgimento dos costumes da sociedade comercial e as paixões do trabalho, Pedro Vianna da Costa e Faria; 4. O sentido da crença: suas funções epistêmicas e implicações para a teoria política de Hume, Lilian Piraine Laranja; 5. O Status do Fideísmo na Crítica de Hume à Religião Natural, Marília Côrtes (...) de Ferraz; 6. Da imaterialidade da alma: a desconstrução mais incisiva de Hume de um pressuposto metafísico, Marcos César Seneda; 7. A “irresistibilidade” e a “inevitabilidade” das crenças naturais e o caráter normativo da epistemologia de Hume, Claudiney José de Sousa; 8. Filosofia e vida comum na epistemologia de Hume, Marcos Fonseca Ribeiro Balieiro; 9. Hume e o relativismo moral, Flávio Zimmermann; 10. Hume e a vivacidade das crenças morais, André Luiz Olivier da Silva; 11. Virtudes sociais e refinamento na filosofia moral de David Hume, Andreh Sabino Ribeiro; 12. O movimento razão-crença na interpretação da teoria da motivação de Hume, Franco Nero Antunes Soares; 13. Sentimentos e Normatividade em David Hume segundo Annette Baier, Giovani Lunardi; 14. Simpatia e aprovação moral da justiça na filosofia de David Hume, Denize Carolina da Cunha & Nivaldo Machado; 15. Do eu como feixe de percepções ao eu das paixões: Hume e a identidade pessoal no Tratado, Susie Kovalczyk dos Santos; 16. Imaginação em Hobbes e Hume: cadeias mentais reguladas e princípios de associação, Andrea Cachel; 17. Hume e o princípio fundamental da filosofia moderna, Rafael Bittencourt Santos; 18. A conexão necessária entre Hume e Malebranche, Bruna Frascolla; 19. Realismo ontológico e antirrealismo epistemológico na problemática sobre o mundo externo em Hume, Leandro Hollanda; 20. Uma possível inversão kantiana da tese humeana da inércia da razão, Carlos Eduardo Moreno Pires; Nota sobre João Paulo Monteiro, Rolf Nelson Kuntz. (shrink)

Filosofía Judía, una noción, problemática, incluso ambigua para muchos, catalogada como incierta, dado su ligamen con una comprensión de filosofía regionalizada, e incluso como una filosofía de una nación. Sin embargo, tales barullos encuentran una contraposición, desde un área académica que apunta al esclarecimiento de la noción. Uno de los trabajos que retoman esta labor de elucidación se desprende del texto intitulado “History of Jewish Philosophy” editado por Daniel H. Frank y Olivier Leaman (1997), en dicho trabajo se realiza (...) una mención de principios y fundamentos, así como una descripción de diferentes momentos del pensamiento desde la época medieval hasta nuestros días. En el escrutinio de las fuentes de reflexión de la designada Filosofía Judía, ahí se reconocer como elementos de inspiración el Tanaj, el Talmud y la interacción con las escuelas griegas de pensamiento; además, en lo que respecta al itinerario investigativo, los autores exponen una serie de propuestas, de múltiples autores ligados a este tendencia, entre los que se pueden citar Moses Maimonides, Hermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber y Emmanuel Levinas. (shrink)

TUCÍDIDES: GUERRA DO PELOPONESO E A BUSCA DA OBJETIVIDADE1 TUCÍDIDES: PELOPONNESE WAR AND THE SEARCH OF OBJECTIVITY Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva2 IFPE - Belo Jardim 1 CONTEXTO HISTÓRICO: GUERRA DE PELOPONESO Os gregos liderados por Atenas e Esparta venceram os persas na batalha naval, em Salamina (480 a.C.), e terrestre, em Plateia (479 a.C.), expulsando-os definitivamente da sua terra. Nos anos seguintes, Atenas consolidou seu poder sobre outras cidades, especialmente nas ilhas do Mar Jônico, formando a Confederação de Delos. (...) Ressentindo-se com a ascensão da rival, Esparta começou a bloquear o desenvolvimento do império ateniense. Temístocles,3 que assumiu papel preponderante nas guerras persas, começou a alertar a seus compatriotas das intenções da grande cidade do Peloponeso. Não obstante, foi derrubada por uma oligarquia, sendo exilado em seguida. Surgiu, então, uma nova liderança do partido democrático, Péricles, que, em 441 a.C., assumiu o governo de Atenas. 4 TUCÍDIDES nasceu, por volta de 465 a 460 a.C., em data incerta, em Halinute, 5 próximo de Atenas, descendente de rica família ateniense, sendo filho de Oberós. Sofreu muito com a grave epidemia de 430 a 427 a.C., na qual faleceu Péricles, mas a ela sobreviveu. Em 424 a.C., era comandante naval das tropas ateniense na Trácia, estacionada na ilha de Samos, mas não conseguiu impedir que o comandante espartano Brasidas ocupasse Anfípolis, cidade de grande importância para o fornecimento de trigo para Atenas, razão pela 6 qual foi exilado no mesmo ano.7 Depois de vinte anos, com o fim da guerra de Peloponeso, pôde retornar do ostracismo, falecendo em 400 a.C., sem ter terminado a sua obra História da Guerra do Peloponeso. Foi educado e influenciado pelas personalidades mais ilustres de Atenas, como Péricles e pelos sofistas, tendo ainda convivido com Eurípedes. Existia narração de encontro seu, ainda adolescente, com HERÔDOTOS, historiador da guerra com os persas e já 8 conhecido em sua época. Este lia trechos de sua História, por ocasião de concurso literário, durante a realização de Jogos Olímpicos, tendo TUCÍDIDES chegado às lágrimas, ao ouvir as narrativas, demonstrando seu pendor para a história.9 O autor escolheu como tema de sua obra a Guerra do Peloponeso, por ele considerada a mais importante até então, como expunha no início de sua obra: “1. O ateniense Tucídides escreveu a história da guerra entre os peloponesos e os atenienses, começando desde os primeiros sinais, na expectativa de que ela seria grande e mais importante que todas as anteriores, pois viu que ambas as partes estavam preparadas em todos os sentidos; além disto, observava os demais helenos aderindo a um lado ou ao outro, uns imediatamente, os restantes pensando em fazê-lo. Com efeito, tratava-se do maior movimento jamais realizado pelos helenos, estendendo-se também a alguns povos bárbaros, bem dizer à maior parte da humanidade”. 10 As relações entre Atenas e Esparta continuaram tensas, principalmente depois que aquela, ignorando essa, levantou uma nova e extensa muralha em sua volta, com a desculpa de precisar de defesa contra os persas. A Confederação de Delos, ao longo dos anos, serviu apenas para fortalecer seu poder marítimo e embelezar a cidade, que tinha sido destruída pelos persas. As cidades-estados que integravam a Confederação como aliadas passaram logo à condição de súditas, perdendo a liberdade. O estopim para a guerra foi a ajuda que os atenienses deram a Córcira, contra sua metrópole, Corinto, aliada dos espartanos, em 431 a.C. No começo, com a força de Atenas, na frota marítima, e de sua rival, com suas falanges, houve apenas incursões periódicas. Contudo, a grande peste de 429 a.C., que levou Péricles, bem como as desastrosas campanhas contra Siracura, na Sicília, em 415 a.C., cidade dória, que fornecia trigo para Esparta, enfraqueceu os atenienses. Logo seus aliados começaram a se revoltar e os espartanos levaram a guerra para a Ática, fazendo com que Atenas capitulasse em 404 a.C., sendo destruída suas muralhas e sua frota naval. O esforço de guerra foi tão grande que todo o mundo grego se enfraqueceu, permitindo que a Macedônia dominasse toda a Grécia, em 338 a.C. A única obra de TUCÍDIDES foi marcada pela objetividade e busca da verdade, evitando as fábulas e as lendas. A História da Guerra do Peloponeso compunha-se de cinco partes: a primeira, o Livro I, tratava da importância dessa guerra e do método histórico do autor; a segunda, os Livros II, III, IV e parte do V, versava sobre a chamada Guerra dos Dez Anos; a terceira, fim do Livro V, descrevia a paz precária; a quarta, Livros VI e VII, cobria a guerra na Sicília; e a quinta, Livro VIII, tratava da chamada Guerra de Decêleia e da operação na Ásia Menor. Faleceu antes de terminar sua obra, deixando-a inacabada, em 400 a.C. Não podia deixar de haver comparações entre as obras de TUCÍDIDES e HERÔDOTOS, pois enquanto este escreveu sobre amplo tema envolvendo várias regiões, povos e época, aquele restringiu seu assunto à Guerra de Peloponeso. O método de 11 TUCÍDIDES foi mais neutro e racional, sendo considerado mais objetivo do que o do outro, pois escrevia apenas com base no conhecimento pessoal ou em informações cuidadosamente verificadas. A exatidão e a objetividade levaram-no a ser considerado um dos maiores historiadores da Antiguidade e, até hoje, admirado pela precisão e pesquisa empreendida. 2 TUCÍDIDES E O MÉTODO: A BUSCA DA OBJETIVIDADE A obra de TUCÍDIDES tem fundamentação teórica no racionalismo de Anaxágora e 12 na visão crítica dos sofistas. Estava voltado para o rigor de exatidão, tanto nos fatos históricos, como na apreciação dos homens e nas descrições do espaço geográfico. Existia em sua obra um método, voltado para a aferição da verdade e a imparcialidade de julgamento, excluindo os mitos e as lendas. O autor procurou, inicialmente, separar seu método do utilizado por HERÔDOTOS ao denunciar que “20 [...] Os homens, na verdade, aceitam uns dos outros relatos de segunda mão dos eventos passados, negligenciando pô-los à prova ainda que tais eventos se relacionem com sua própria terra. [...] A tal ponto chegou a aversão de certos homens pela pesquisa meticulosa da verdade e tão grande é a predisposição para valer-se apenas do que está ao alcance da mão”.14 TUCÍDIDES procurou elaborar sua análise das ações históricas, como a movimentação de tropas e os combates, as matérias relativas à opinião pública, as discussões dos dirigentes sobre a estratégia adequada ou o confronto entre as delegações diplomáticas. Procurou, então, explicar a complexidade da situação política e a dificuldade de se escolher a opção adequada. Para ele, o conflito era permanente entre as soluções adequadas aos problemas apresentados, com base na influência sofista. O método utilizado significava exprimir a complexidade da situação e a dificuldade de escolha, dentro de um mesmo contexto. A discussão contraditória entre os oponentes representava as opções extremadas das soluções de problemas.15 Para Jackeline de Romilly, o método utilizado foi o da antiloquia, que consistia em opor discursos. Essa autora indicava que a metodologia de TUCÍDIDES estava perfeitamente exemplificada, nos dois discursos pronunciados em Camerina, por Heróncrates e pelo ateniense Eufemos, no Livro VI (§§ 75 a 87). Usava a prática jurídica, pois entre os gregos havia o hábito de sempre se ouvir duas teorias adversas, apresentadas como o maior vigor possível, de modo que da relação entre os dois discursos pudesse sair a verdade.16 Coube a TUCÍDIDES, ainda, a paternidade da investigação do passado, em um trabalho quase de arqueologia, ainda que ele não se tivesse preocupado em fazer escavações. Não obstante, trouxe para a história novas provas e informações. O autor afirmava, então, que: “22. [...] O empenho em apurar os fatos se constitui numa tarefa laboriosa, pois as testemunhas oculares de vários eventos nem sempre faziam os mesmos relatos a respeito das mesmas coisas, mas variavam de acordo com suas simpatias por um lado ou pelo outro, ou de acordo com sua memória. Pode acontecer que a ausência do fabuloso em minha narrativa pareça menos agradável ao ouvido, mas quem quer que deseje ter uma ideia clara tanto dos eventos ocorridos quanto daqueles que algum dia voltarão a ocorrer em circunstâncias idênticas ou semelhante em consequência de seu conteúdo humano, julgará minha história útil e isto me bastará. Na verdade, ela foi feita para ser patrimônio sempre útil, e não uma composição a ser ouvida no momento da competição por algum prêmio”. 17 A obra de TUCÍDIDES tinha seus problemas, pois às vezes era lenta e cansativa, sem a graça e a criatividade de HERÔDOTOS, mas a objetividade obtida representava um marco na análise histórica e política da humanidade. Precedera em dois mil anos a própria criação da ciência, podendo dizer que sua pesquisa tinha rigor científico e busca da verdade. Por outro lado, várias de suas antilogias foram criadas pelo autor, a partir de informações orais, com o uso da contradição, mas sem chegar exatamente a uma síntese, apenas informando as posições contrárias, sem qualquer opção pessoal. Notas: 1 In. COSTA, N. N. Ciência Política. 3. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Forense, 2012. p. 68-74. 2 Tecnólogo em agropecuária pelo Instituto Federal de Pernambuco campus Belo Jardim. Normalista pela Escola Frei Cassiano Comacchio. Pesquisador assíduo de assuntos com cunho filosófico, com ênfase em política. 3 “Temístocles, general e político ateniense (Atenas, c. 525 – Magnésia do Menandro, c. 460 a.C.). Chefe do partido democrático, havia aconselhado osateniensesa voltarem todasas suasatividades paraaexpansão marítima, encontrado neste ponto a oposição de Aristides, chefe do partido aristocrático. Tendo obtido a condenação deste ao ostracismo, Temístocles fez construir o porto de Pireu e equipou excelente frota. Ao ser invadidaa Grécia por Xerxes, obrigou os persas a aceitar um combate naval, antes que o exército grego se retirasse para o Peloponeso, daí resultando a vitória de Salamina (480). Apesar da oposição de Esparta, rival de Atenas, Temístocles fez reconstruir as muralhas de Atenas, fortificou a parte de Pireu e de Muníquia. Contado, em decorrência das intrigas de Esparta, foiacusado de peculato e condenado ao ostracismo (471)” (KOOGAN/HOUAISS. Enciclopédia e Dicionário Ilustrado, op. cit., p. 1558). 4 Vide nota 7 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 5 “Tucídides em gr. Thoukidídes, historiador grego (Atenas c. 465 – 395 a.C.). Eleito estratego em 424 a.C., foi encarregado da defesa do litoral da Trácia durante a Guerra do Peloponeso. Derrotado, viu-se forçado a partir para o exílio e só regressou à sua pátria por volta de 404 a.C. No exílio começou aescrever (431 a.C.) suas Histórias da Guerra do Peloponeso, que não chegou a terminar e que é uma profundareflexão políticasobrea natureza do poder indo em busca das causas profundas dosacontecimentos. O desenvolvimento do conflito éaí narrado em estilo simples e direto, por vezes entremeados de trechos de grande força emotiva, como o discurso de Péricles sobre atenienses mortos na guerra. Além de ter sido o compilador de um relato concreto dos acontecimentos. Túcides é considerado o primeiro historiador a adotar uma postura críticaem relação aeles” (Grande Enciclopédia Larousse Cultural, op. cit., vol. 23, p. 5734). 6 “104. [...] E mandaram um mensageiro ao outro comandante para o território fronteiro à Trácia; ele era Tucídides filho de Oloros, o autor desta História, na época estacionado em Tasos, ilha situada a aproximadamente meio-dia de viagem por mar de Anfípolis e colônia de Paros, e lhe pediam para socorrê-los. Recebendo a mensagem, ele partiu imediatamente com sete naus que se encontravam lá, pois queriam chegar o mais depressa possível, principalmente para socorrer Anfípolis antes dela render-se, ou, se isto não fosse possível para ocupar Êion. 105. Nesse ínterim Brasidas, temendo a vinda dos de Tasos, e tendo ouvido dizer que Tucídides, um detentor dos direitos de exploração das minas de ouro naquela parte da Trácia, exercendo por isso grande influência sobre os homens mais importantes do continente, apressou-se em capturar a cidade” (TUCÍDIDES. A Guerra do Peloponeso. 3ª ed. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1987, pp. 228-9). 7 “26. [...] Vivi a guerra inteira, tendo umaidade que me permitiaformar meu próprio juízo, e segui-aatentamente, de modo a obter informações precisas. Atingiu-me também uma condenação ao exílio que me manteve longe de minha terra por vinte anos após meu período de comando em Anfípolis e, diante de minhafamiliaridade com asatividades de ambos os lados, especialmente aquelas do Peloponeso em consequência de meu banimento, graças ao meu ócio pude acompanhar melhor o curso dos acontecimentos” (TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 255). 8 Vide nota 12 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 9 KURY, Mário Gama (Introdução. In: TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 13) cita com referência dos fatos a obra de Marcelino, que escreveu a Vida de Tucídides, na época do imperador bizantino Justiniano. 10 TUCÍDIDES. A Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 19. 11 “Tucídides começou do ponto em que Herôdotos deixou a narração – o termo de Guerra Persa. [...] Herôdotos escrevia com o fito de entreter o leitor culto; Tucídides escreve visando fornecer informaçõesaos futuros historiadores e orientar com a experiência do passado aos futuros estadistas. Herôdotos narra em estilo solto e fluente, inspirado talvez pelo modo dos poemas de Homero; Tucídides, como alguém que tinha ouvido filósofos, oradores e dramaturgos, escreve em estilo frequentemente complicado e obscuro. [...] Herôdotos abrangia os mais remotos lugares, e as mais variadas épocas; Tucídides força a sua história numa severa moldura cronológica de estações e anos sacrificando a continuidade da narrativa. Herôdotos escrevia mais à luz das personalidades do que dos processos, sentindo que estes se operam através daqueles; Tucídides, [...] inclina-se mais para o relato impessoal e para a consideração das causas, desenvolvimentos e resultado. Herôdotos descrevia acontecimentos remotos, a ele narrados, na maioria das vezes, de segunda e terceira mão; Tucídides com frequênciase exprime baseado na própriatestemunha, no de quem informa ou em documentos originais, em vários trechos reproduz os documentos citados” (DURANT, Will. A História da Civilização. nossa herança clássica, op. cit., vol. II, p. 341). 12 Vide nota 8 do capítulo II, Herôdotos. 13 “Os primeiros desses novos humanistas, os Sofistas, salientaram-se no tempo da grande eclosão do individualismo que se referem às Guerras Persas e da difusão da democracia por todo o mundo grego e os sofistas consideravam perda de tempo a busca de uma vaga e fugitiva verdade a respeito do universo. Achavam muito melhor estudar o problema, bem mais prático, do homem e da sociedade. Como mestres, sua finalidade ideal era preparar jovens para assumirem sua responsabilidade de cidadão” (SAVELLE, Max (coord.), História da Civilização Mundial: as primeiras culturas humanas, op. cit., vol. I, p. 203). 14 TUCÍDIDES. História de Guerra do Peloponeso, op. cit., p. 27. 15 CHÂTELLET, François. Tucídides: a guerra do peloponeso. In: CHÂTELLET, François, DUHAMEL, Olivier, e PISIER, Evelyne. Dicionário de Obras Políticas. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 1993, p. 1.221. 16 “Os Gregos sempre viram no princípio daantilogiaa própria condição dasabedoriae da compreensão. A antilogiaé a deliberação” (ROMILLY, Jackeline de. História e Razão em Tucídides. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1998, p. 143). 17 TUCÍDIDES. História da Guerra de Peloponeso, Livro Primeiro, op. cit., p. 28. (shrink)

This paper defends the view that Newtonian forces are real, symmetrical and non-causal relations. First, I argue that Newtonian forces are real; second, that they are relations; third, that they are symmetrical relations; fourth, that they are not species of causation. The overall picture is anti-Humean to the extent that it defends the existence of forces as external relations irreducible to spatio-temporal ones, but is still compatible with Humean approaches to causation (and others) since it denies that forces are a (...) species of causation. (shrink)

Although widely used across psychology, economics, and philosophy, the concept ofeffort is rarely ever defined. This article argues that the time is ripe to look for anexplicit general definition of effort, makes some proposals about how to arrive at thisdefinition, and suggests that a force-based approach is the most promising. Section 1presents an interdisciplinary overview of some chief research axes on effort, and arguesthat few, if any, general definitions have been proposed so far. Section 2 argues thatsuch a definition is (...) now needed and proposes a basic methodology to arrive at it, whosefirst step is to make explicit the various tacit assumptions about effort made acrosssciences and ordinary thinking. Section 3 unearths 4 different conceptions of effortfrom research on effort so far:primitive-feelings accounts,comparator-based accounts,resource-based accountsandforce-based accounts. It is then argued that the first 2kinds of accounts, although interesting in their own right, are not strictly speaking abouteffort. Section 4 considers the 2 most promising general approaches to efforts: re-source-based and force-based accounts. It argues that these accounts are not only compatible but actually extensionally equivalent. This notwithstanding, it explains why force-based accounts should be regarded as more fundamental than resource-basedaccounts -/- . (shrink)

Scientists often communicate using generic generalizations, which are unquantified generalizations such as ‘Americans overestimate social class mobility’ or ‘sound waves carry gravitational mass’. In this paper, I explain the role of such generic generalizations in science, based on a novel theory about their characteristic meaning. According to this theory, a scientific generalization of the form ‘Ks are F’ says that F is one property based on which category K qualifies as a scientific kind. Because what it takes to qualify as (...) a scientific kind varies depending on the discipline, what a generic sentence entails also varies. Based on this semantic theory, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using generic language in science. (shrink)

One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co- occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for (...) several other epistemic operations that natural kinds support. Natural kinds also play a role in scientific explanations and categorizations. A theory of natural kinds can only account for these additional kind-based epistemic practices if it also analyzes their causal structure. (shrink)

This chapter defends an axiological theory of pain according to which pains are bodily episodes that are bad in some way. Section 1 introduces two standard assumptions about pain that the axiological theory constitutively rejects: (i) that pains are essentially tied to consciousness and (ii) that pains are not essentially tied to badness. Section 2 presents the axiological theory by contrast to these and provides a preliminary defense of it. Section 3 introduces the paradox of pain and argues that since (...) the axiological theory takes the location of pain at face value, it needs to grapple with the privacy, self-intimacy and incorrigibility of pain. Sections 4, 5 and 6 explain how the axiological theory may deal with each of these. (shrink)

This paper defends a realist account of the composition of Newtonian forces, dubbed ‘residualism’. According to residualism, the resultant force acting on a body is identical to the component forces acting on it that do not prevent each other from bringing about its acceleration. Several reasons to favor residualism over alternative accounts of the composition of forces are advanced. (i) Residualism reconciles realism about component forces with realism about resultant forces while avoiding any threat of causal overdetermination. (ii) Residualism provides (...) a systematic semantics for the term ‘force’ within Newtonian mechanics. (iii) Residualism allows us to precisely apportion the causal responsibility of each component force in the ensuing acceleration. (iv) Residualism handles special cases such as null forces, single forces, and antagonistic forces in a natural way. (v) Residualism provides a neat picture of the causal powers of forces: each force essentially has two causal powers⎯the power to bring about accelerations (sometimes together with other co-directionnal forces) and the power to prevent other forces from doing so⎯exactly one of which is manifested at a time. (vi) Residualism avoids commitment to unobservable effects of forces: forces cause either stresses (tensile or compressive) or accelerations. (shrink)

Brentano’s theory of continuity is based on his account of boundaries. The core idea of the theory is that boundaries and coincidences thereof belong to the essence of continua. Brentano is confident that he developed a full-fledged, boundary-based, theory of continuity1; and scholars often concur: whether or not they accept Brentano’s take on continua they consider it a clear contender. My impression, on the contrary, is that, although it is infused with invaluable insights, several aspects of Brentano’s account of continuity (...) remain inchoate. To be clear, the theory of boundaries on which it relies, as well as the account of ontological dependence that Brentano develops alongside his theory of boundaries, constitute splendid achievements. However, the passage from the theory of boundaries to the account of continuity is rather sketchy. This paper pinpoints some chief problems raised by this transition, and proposes some solutions to them which, if not always faithful to the letter of Brentano’s account of continua, are I believe faithful to its spirit. §1 presents Brentano’s critique of the mathematical account of the continuous. §2 introduces Brentano’s positive account of continua. §3 raises three worries about Brentano’s account of continuity. §4 proposes a Neo-Brentanian approach to continua that handles these worries. (shrink)

Generic stereotypes are generically formulated generalizations that express a stereotype, like “Mexican immigrants are rapists” and “Muslims are terrorists.” Stereotypes like these are offensive and should not be asserted by anyone. Yet when someone does assert a sentence like this in a conversation, it is surprisingly difficult to successfully rebut it. The meaning of generic sentences is such that they can be true in several different ways. As a result, a speaker who is challenged after asserting a generic stereotype can (...) often simply dismiss the objection and maintain that the stereotype is true in a way that is compatible with the challenger’s objection. In this paper, a semantic theory for generics is presented that accounts for this type of defensive shifting in upholding generic stereotypes. This theory is then used to develop two strategies to object more efficiently. The first strategy is to immediately deny that either of the two possible ways in which a generic can be true obtains. The second strategy is to deny the satisfaction of an additional condition that is necessary for a generic sentence to be true. (shrink)

Formalisms such as description logics (DL) are sometimes expected to help terminologies ensure compliance with sound ontological principles. The objective of this paper is to study the degree to which one DL-based biomedical terminology (SNOMED CT) complies with such principles. We defined seven ontological principles (for example: each class must have at least one parent, each class must differ from its parent) and examined the properties of SNOMED CT classes with respect to these principles. Our major results are: 31% of (...) the classes have a single child; 27% have multiple parents; 51% do not exhibit any differentiae between the description of the parent and that of the child. The applications of this study to quality assurance for ontologies are discussed and suggestions are made for dealing with multiple inheritance. (shrink)